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HARRY G. BROADMAN* and JOY DUNKERLEY**

The Drilling Gap in Non-OPEC
Developing Countries: The Role of
Contractual and Fiscal
ArrangementsINTRODUCTION
Despite the tremendous increase in the real price of oil over the past
decade, exploration and development activity in many non-OPEC developing countries (NODCs) has languished relative to other areas of the
world.' Factors responsible for this skewed pattern might include poor
geologic prospects, excessive political risk, and lack of infrastructure
development. Poorly designed contractual and fiscal arrangements, which
result in an unsatisfactory sharing of risks and rewards between the host
government and foreign investors, might also constrain petroleum investment in NODCs.2 This article analyzes the sources of risk in oil
exploration and development activity, and how insights from economic
theory can be used to analyze the efficiency of risk-sharing in contractual
and fiscal arrangements.
ECONOMIC RISK IN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
Investment in petroleum exploration and development is a risky economic activity. There is considerable uncertainty about the relationship
between funds expended and output, and uncertainty about costs and
future prices. Drilling expenditures may produce dry holes or only small
discoveries. Indeed, uncertainty pervades the complex relationships between the different investment decisions and outcomes which occur
throughout the various stages of the petroleum supply process. Moreover,
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1. NATIONAL PEmOtEuM CouNcIL, Tum WORLD PETRoLEUM DEVELOPMENT 8 (1982).
2. For an analysis of the relative importance of contractual and fiscal arrangements, resource
potential, political risk, and infrastructure development as determinants of exploration activity in
NODCs, see Broadman, Incentivesand Constraintson ExploratoryDrillingin Developing Countries,
10 ANN. REV. ENERGY (1985).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

Cash
flow

3W

0

Development costs
'Revenue
d Operating costs

Figure 1. Cash Flow Time Profile of Petroleum Exploration and Development Project

the process of exploration and development of a non-renewable resource,
such as petroleum, is inherently dynamic. Both expectations about the
time path of prices and the effects of current decisions on future costs
must be taken into account. The effects of resource depletion must also
be incorporated into the sequence of investment decisions.'
Figure 1 illustrates the time profile of cash flow for a "typical" exploration and development project. Current cash flow is important because
project costs are generally deductible from current revenue. Cash flow is
negative until the extraction, or production, process begins. The area
denoted by a depicts early exploratory work, for example, seismic sur3. See D. Born & M. Tommt, ANALYziNG NONRENEwABLE ResouRcs SUPPLY (1984).
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veys. Area b includes other exploration costs and the costs of field development. The overlap of areas a and b depicts that the time paths of
costs expended in exploration and development activities typically do not
have discrete boundaries. Area c is operating revenue, and d depicts the
operating costs of production. Operating costs include those associated
with well servicing, and to the extent they are used, with enhanced
recovery techniques.
Operating costs tend to increase while operating revenues decrease
over time because as a well becomes depleted its productivity declines. 4
Because the various costs and revenues occur over time, net profitability
of a project cannot be measured by simply summing and comparing the
areas above and below the time line. Rather the present value of revenues
must be compared with costs also appropriately discounted.
Owing in large part to the economic distinction between exploration
and development activities, different risks are associated with each of the
two stages. Exploration entails risk that derives largely from uncertainty
about the resource potential of an area's geology, which not only includes
the uncertainty about the existence of resources but also the size, quality,
and accessiblity of the deposits. Development risk also emanates from
uncertainty, over the same factors, which largely determine cost conditions. Development risk also reflects uncertainty about the factors which
affect the extent to which an investment will be commercial, such as the
price of oil and competing fuels. The economic risk associated with
exploration is usually thought to be greater than that associated with
development. 5
The allocation of funds invested among exploration and development
projects is determined by ranking each project's expected or probabilityweighted net present value, that is, the sum of discounted net revenues
after adjustment for risk where risk is conventionally measured as the
variance of a project's profit.6 All other things being equal, the more
risky the project the lower its risk-adjusted net present value. Economic
efficiency requires that under the assumption of risk aversion, in the
absence of extraneous considerations, the reward structure of investment
should match that of risk. A lower expected return is, therefore, required
to induce risk-averse parties to invest in low-risk ventures than the expected return that is required for riskier investments.
Fundamentally, there are two dimensions of risk. One component is
associated with all exploration and development projects and is attributed
4. S. McDoNALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
16 (1971).
5. M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PErROLEUM MARKET 25 (1972).
6. R. MIKEsE.L, PETROLEUM COMPANY OPERATIONS & AGREMMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING COUNmES
30-35 (1984).
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to systematic economic forces, which affect the outcome of all such
investments, such as the price of oil. The other component of risk results
from various project-specific characteristics which include the geologic
structure of the area in which exploration is contemplated and the degree
of field accessibility. Economic theory suggests that, from the standpoint
of an individual investor, all risk which is project-specific can be diversified away by taking on other exploration and development projects.7
Project diversification, however, cannot eliminate the portion of risk inherent in all exploration and development investments. It is this nondiversifiable risk with which we are concerned.
In NODCs, as in other areas around the world, the allocation of risks
and rewards between the parties to an exploration and development investment, the host government and a foreign oil company, is governed
by institutional arrangements: contracts and taxes. The theory of principalagent relations and optimal incentive contracting provides insights into
how such arrangements can establish an economically efficient distribution of risk and create incentives for each party to perform according to
the contract in an efficient manner.
Briefly, starting from the definition of an efficient allocation of risk as
one in which one party cannot be made better off without impairing the
other party, the theory suggests that an efficient allocation of risk will be
realized only if a contract adequately reflects differences between the
parties in terms of their risk-bearing attitudes.' In the specific case where
all parties to a contract are risk-averse, an optimal contract is one that
provides for risk-sharing (in accordance with each party's relative degree
of risk-aversion). 9 In addition, the theory indicates that efficiency in
contract performance will depend on the need for and the cost of contract
monitoring, and the degree to which there is "opportunistic" behavior
by one of the parties, for example, reneging on an entire contract or on
some specific provisions of the contract."0 Finally, the theory shows that
the extent to which an efficient risk-reward structure can be negotiated
into a contract will depend, in part, on the relative bargaining power of
the parties."
Keeping in mind these observations from theory, the allocation of risk
and the degree of efficiency embodied in the contractual and taxation
7. See Jensen, CapitalMarkets: Theory and Evidence, BELL J. ECON. 357-98 (1972).
8. See, e.g., Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal'sProblem, 63 AM. ECON.
REv. 134-39 (1973).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal andAgent Relationship, BELL
J. ECON. 55-73 (1979) and Harris & Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information,
20 J. ECON. THEORY 231-59 (1979).
11. Id.
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arrangements governing petroleum exploration and development in nonOPEC developing countries in practice will be examined.
CONTRACTUAL AND TAXATION ARRANGEMENTS IN NODCS
Contracts
In this section, contractual arrangements, the institutional rules governing the allocation of risks and rewards as well as the distribution of
management responsibilities for the actual operation of NODC exploration
and development projects, will be considered. Below is a discussion of
the companion set of institutional rules, taxation arrangements, which
also governs the allocation of risks and rewards but does not govern the
distribution of management responsibilities. The conditions set forth by
NODC contractual and taxation arrangements may be defined on a case
by case basis for each specific project or they may be codified more
generally into a host country's petroleum legislation.' 2
Whether defined on a project-specific basis or by the host country's
legal system, several basic provisions are typically covered in NODC oil
exploration and development contracts. In the exploration stage, the mandated conditions include delineation of the geographic area to be explored,
minimum work and expenditures, conditions for relinquishment, data
sharing, and the duration of the contract.' 3 Provisions relating to the
development and production phase include the definition of a commercial
discovery, the level and rate of production, disposal of associated gas,
access to and ownership of crude supplies, transfer of technical expertise,
the value ("market" price) of oil produced, and conditions for determining
the allocation and remittance of profits derived from the operation. 4
Conceptually, four broad classes of contractual arrangements can be
distinguished: (1) concessions, (2) production-sharing contracts, (3) nonrisk service contracts, and (4) risk service contracts. A fifth, joint venture,
is sometimes identified as a separate category, but is more accurately only
a variation or subset of the other four. These four different contractual
arrangements provide for four somewhat different allocations of risks and
rewards between the host country and the foreign investor.
Concessions are arrangements under which an oil company obtains a
lease from a government to explore in a well-defined geographic area."
The company provides all the capital for exploration, and if petroleum
is discovered, the company is free to develop and market it. In exchange,
12.
13.
14.
15.

See 1 BARROWs COMPANY INC., WORLD PETROLEUM ARRANGEMENTS (1980).
Id. at 26-43.
Id.
Supra note 12, at 44-46.
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the company usually pays a royalty to the host government for each barrel
produced. Traditional concession agreements are of long term (10-60
years) and, like the 1901 Anglo-Persian concession in Iran,1 6 give the
contractor more discretion over rates of exploration and production than
do recent versions. Modern concession arrangements often give the contractor more limited property rights and more strictly define the timetable
of operation and company obligations.' 7 In general, however, concessions
do not provide for any direct participation in exploration and development
operations by the host government. Still, while all exploration risks are
borne by the contractor, the government shares indirectly the development
risks associated with the company's ability to market, and hence extract
and pay royalties on, discoveries.
Under production-sharing contracts, the oil company again provides
all exploration and development capital. But if it makes a commercial
discovery, rather than recovering its costs by income generated from sales
(as under concessions), the company recovers its costs by obtaining a
portion of the oil produced, referred to as "cost oil."' 8 The balance of
output, "profit oil," is divided between the government and the oil company according to the provisions of the contract.' 9 The government share
of profit oil varies widely; for example, Chile receives fifteen percent of
profit oil; Peru, fifty percent; and Egypt eighty-five percent.2 ° The government's share of profit oil is analogous to the royalty received on output
under traditional concession arrangements. Generally, taxes are also paid
to the host government by the oil company on the company's share of
profit oil. Like concessions, the oil company bears all exploration risks
under production-sharing contracts. Unlike concessions, however, under
production-sharing arrangements the government shares directly in the
development risks; if the outcome of the company's exploration efforts
is a commercial discovery, the host country, in effect, compensates the
oil company with a return commensurate with the exploration risk the
company bore.
Non-risk service contracts are arrangements whereby the oil company
provides an exploration and/or development service and is then compensated by the government for the investment and operating costs of services
rendered. 2 For exploration services, compensation is generally a flat fee;
for development services, compensation can be in cash or crude, but is
usually a flat fee per barrel, and sometimes includes the right to "pur16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

J. BLArR, Ti CONTROL OF On. 43-47 (1976).
1 WORLD PETROLEUM ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 44-46.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 65-68.
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chase" a share of the output. In either case, the contractor receives
compensation regardless of the outcome of its activity. Under such contracts all risks are borne by the host country, and the company is guaranteed its fee regardless of the efficiency of its performance.
Risk service contracts combine features of production-sharing and nonrisk service contracts. Under risk service contracts, all exploration risks
are borne by the foreign investor, but the host country assumes the development risks. The oil company provides the exploration outlays, and
if a commercial discovery is made, the company contracts with the host
country to develop the discovery.22 The development service fee is structured such that the company must make the development outlays, and is
compensated for its exploration and development costs only after production begins. Usually the company also obtains a share of sales. Compensation is most often made in cash, but can be made with oil. A variant
of this type of contract is where the host country's state-owned oil company is responsible for the production phase of the project, but the foreign
company still conducts the exploration and development operations. In
both cases, title to the oil is retained by the host country.
Joint ventures, wherein the host government participates as an equity
partner with a foreign investor, usually occur in NODCs in the development rather than in the exploration stage.' With the company assuming
the exploration risks, joint ventures usually provide first for recovery of
the company's exploration costs. The balance of the oil is shared in
proportion to each party's equity interest in the project. The company is
compensated for any development costs it incurs and receives any profits
obtained in the sale of the oil, both in proportion to its equity interest.
The oil company generally also pays the host government taxes on its
share of the profits. A pure joint venture wherein both parties share, in
proportion to their equity interest, the risks and rewards of a combined
exploration and development project is rarely formed in NODCs.
Within the last two decades in NODCs there has been a shift away
from almost exclusive reliance on concession arrangements toward a
mixture of contract forms.24 While concessions are still predominant,
production-sharing contracts are becoming increasingly common.' Service contracts, both the risk and non-risk forms, are more widespread,
too, but are in practice often limited to those countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Peru which have existing production, proven reserves, and a
certain level of indigenous expertise in petroleum development.26
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 57-64.
Id. at 68-73.
Broadman, supranote 2.
Id.
Id.
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If there is one overriding implication of the shift away from concession
arrangements that has taken place, it is that, generally, there is now greater
government participation in petroleum investment activity in NODCs.
There is greater government assumption of risk, though primarily at the
development rather than the exploration phase, stronger government voice
in management and operations, and more government ownership of crude.
It is symptomatic of this shift that many international oil company exploration and development contracts in NOD Cs are no longer with foreign
ministries, but with newly-formed enterprises nominally responsible for
overseeing domestic hydrocarbon development, state-owned oil companies."
Particular contract terms have also been rewritten to accommodate an
increased role of the host government. The definition of commercial
discovery, traditionally decided by the foreign oil company, is now usually
determined by the company in conjunction with the host government. In
Brazil, for example, the definition of commercial discovery is made in
conjunction with the state-owned oil company (Petrobras) on the basis
of an estimated discounted cash flow.28 Also, the introduction of "sole
risk" provisions allows one partner in a joint venture, usually the host
government, to proceed with development without the agreement of the
other partner. Current contracts, moreover, ofter contain specific provisions for the training and participation of host country nationals in the
petroleum exploitation process.29
On the other hand, some areas previously denied to foreign oil companies have been made accessible. For example, since 1973, Brazil 30 and
India 3 have relaxed previously established state monopolies for petroleum
investment and now permit foreign oil companies to undertake exploration
and development, usually in offshore areas. Nonetheless, despite these
relaxations, there are still limitations on foreign exploration and development of certain acreage in many NODCs.32
Taxation
There are three dominant types of taxation schemes for oil exploration
and development in NODCs: (I) royalties, (2) signature bonuses, and (3)
profit taxes.
Royalties based on a fixed percentage of production historically have
been the predominant form of taxes and are generally used in conjunction
27. See, e.g., F. GHADAR, THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN OIL-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1982).
28. 1 WORLD PETROLEUM ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 61-62.
29. Id.
30. 3 PETRO-CANADA & PETRoLEoS DE VENEZUELA, WORLD OIL SUPPLY PROSPECTS (1980).

31. F. GHADAR, supra note 27, at 145.
32. See generally supra note 30.
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with concession arrangements. Under a traditional royalty system, the
host government collects cash from the contractor as soon as commercial
production begins. The fact that royalty payments are a function of output,
and hence revenue, rather than profits, has important implications for the
allocation of risk. Typically an exploration and development project begins earning revenues long before it begins earning a profit. As a result,
production-based taxes, such as royalties, allocate most of the development risk to the contractor.
Under signature bonuses, the contractor generally pays an amount of
money to the host government when a contract is initiated. Signature
bonuses are most often used when the companies participate in competitive bidding for contracts and are a measure of a company's willingness
to pay for the opportunity to explore for oil. Signature bonuses are also
used in negotiated contracts which, in contrast to the U.S. competitive
bidding system, are more prevalent in NODCs.33 In any event, signature
bonuses are not the primary tax instruments in NODCs; they serve only
a nominal revenue-raising function.
Profit taxes are analogous to royalties except they are not determined
by output or gross revenues but are based on the company's net income.
The tax burden, therefore, falls on the company later in the life of a
project than it would under a royalty system. Moreover, relative to royalties, taxes on profits tend to result in a higher degree of risk-sharing.
Increasingly prevalent in NODCs are various types of profit taxes
designed to earn the host government revenue when there are "windfall"
profits. One such tax scheme, based on the concept of resource rent,
usually involves subjecting the contractor's net income to a higher tax
rate when the rate of return on the project exceeds a particular level.'
This taxation scheme was first introduced in Papua New Guinea.35 Another
type of profit tax is also aimed at capturing "windfalls." Malaysia, for
example, imposes higher income taxes when international oil prices rise
above a specified level. 36
There is another important difference between royalties and taxes on
income. Income taxes paid to foreign governments can, in some countries
including the United States, be entirely credited against taxes owed to
the company's home government. Income taxes are, therefore, less onerous to oil companies engaged in foreign investment than are royalties,
because royalties are only deductible rather than creditable. Taxes paid
by an oil company to a host government in the form of oil, as is often
33. 1 WORLD PETROLEuM ARRANGEMENTs,supra note 12, at 17-20.
34. See Gamaut & Clunies-Ross, Uncertainty,Risk and Taxing of NaturalResource Projects, 85
EcoN. J. 272-87 (1975), and Palmer, Mineral Taxation in Developing Countries:An Application of
Resource Rent Tax, 27 INT'L MONETARY FutD STAFF PAPERS, 517-30 (1980).
35. Gamaut & Clunies Ross, supra note 34; Palmer, supra note 34.
36. Mi.EsELL, supra note 6, at 87.
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the case in a production-sharing agreement, however, have been disallowed in the United States as a tax credit since 1976. 37 As a result, in
some countries, for example, Indonesia, production-sharing contracts were
renegotiated so that the U.S. companies' tax payments in the form of oil
to the host country appeared in the form of taxes creditable against the
companies' other U.S. tax liabilities.38 Of course, in the countries where
this type of renegotiation has not occurred, the effective tax burden on
U.S. oil companies will likely be higher under production-sharing contracts than under other contract forms.
In general, in the United States, tax policy has become more restrictive
with respect to the crediting of taxes paid to foreign governments against
U.S. tax liabilities. 39 In 1975, Congress enacted a statute which allowed
U.S. oil companies to exclude from their total taxable foreign oil-related
income any losses incurred in another country." The so-called single
country loss rule effectively raised the level of foreign oil-related income
and allowed a greater application of foreign tax credits than would otherwise be the case. The net impact of the rule was to stimulate new exploration projects abroad. In 1982, however, Congress passed the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA)4 ' which repealed the single
country loss rule.
The overall trend in petroleum exploration and development taxation
in NODCs over the last fifteen years has been toward higher tax yields
accruing to host governments.4 2 The change has been almost uniform
owing to a "demonstration effect." '43 The increase in tax yields is the
result of higher levels of taxation and a change in the mix of instruments.
Higher levels of taxation have been accomplished in two ways. First, in
administering any given instrument, higher tax rates have been applied.
Second, there has been movement from specific to ad valorem taxes,
reductions in tax holidays, decreases in percentage depletion allowances,
and greater scrutiny of transfer prices governing transactions between
foreign oil company exploration and development affiliates and their parent companies.
The most notable change in the mix of fiscal instruments has been a
shift from flat royalties to graduated income taxes and, in a number of
cases, to taxes on resource rent. The greater reliance on profit taxes, in
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
J. 619
43.

1, at 17-19.
MuIEsELL, supra note 6, at 61-62.
NATIONAL PETROLEUM Coumcm, supra note 1, at 17-21.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
See Gillis, Evolution of Natural Resource Taxation in Developing Countries, 22 NAT. R.s.
(1982).
Id.
NATIONAL PmrROLEUM CouNcIL, supra note
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particular, resource rent taxes, implies that, for the same level of tax
yield, the structure of taxation is different.
Tax structure is critical in determining how efficiently petroleum resources of different quality will be exploited. In this regard, a key question
is to what extent does the typical tax structure in NODCs discriminate
among fields of different size? Generally, exploration and development
costs per barrel vary inversely with field size." Accordingly, economic
profits and rent will similarly vary with field size. Until recently, tax
structure within most NODCs tended to be constant across oil fields of
all sizes.45 Because profitability is a function of field size, however, tax
systems which yield satisfactory returns for large, low-cost fields may
not provide adequate returns for small, high-cost fields. An efficient tax
structure is one that allows the host government to capture its desired
portion of economic rent but does not distort investors' incentives to
explore and develop oil resources of varying quality. A progressive tax
system in which tax rates increase with oil field profitability meets this
efficiency test. In theory, a progressive tax reduces investor risk, that is,
reduces the variance of return, and increases both the level of company
investment and host country proceeds. 4
This suggests that the high-cost, low-volume fields, which are thought
to be characteristic of NODCs,47 may be made more attractive by introducing a progressive tax structure. A signature bonus often amounts to
committing large cost outlays even before an investment proceeds. A
signature bonus is, therefore, regressive, and raises the investor's variance
of returns. Traditional royalties, depending upon how they are structured,
may be regressive but could be proportional across fields of varying sizes.
Production-based taxes, in general, result in the contractor assuming a
larger share of the super-profits generated from large fields than the share
of profits generated from small fields that are only marginally profitable
on a pre-tax basis.4 8 Resource rent taxes, on the other hand, are progressive and have the advantage of providing the contractor with a specified rate of return, reduced exposure to risk, and quicker cost recovery
on small fields. Although the main cause for the introduction of this last
type of tax was to capture windfalls for the host country, it also introduces
progressivity into the structure of taxes.
44. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREAsuRY, AN EXAMINATION OF THE WORLD BANK ENERGY
LENDING PROGRAM 7-8 (1981).

45. Gillis, supra note 42, at 633.
46. See, e.g., Stauffer & Gault, Effects of PetroleumTax Design on Explorationand Development
(paper presented at the 1981 Economics & Evaluation Symposium, Soc. Petroleum Engineers, at
Dallas, Texas, February 25-27, 1981).
47. MuEsELL, supra note 6, at 8-9.
48. A. KEMP & D. RosE, INVESTMENT IN OIL EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPINT: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE EFFEcrs OF TAXATION (1982).
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The recent trend toward the adoption of resource rent taxes is thus
likely to make petroleum exploration in NODCs more efficient. Other
changes in tax arrangements, such as differential royalties (for example,
a two-part or sliding-scale tariff type of regime), would make exploitation
of small, high-cost fields more attractive as well.
The results of recent simulation experiments provide further evidence
of the bias inherent in regressive or proportional tax systems against
exploiting small volume, high-cost fields.49 This bias applied to all systems investigated, including those in Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, and
Egypt.5 Current taxation arrangements were found to bring about a considerable drop in the profitability of marginal fields when the price of oil
decreases only slightly. 51 In general, these experiments suggest that despite recent changes in taxation arrangements, present tax systems still
discriminate against exploiting high-cost, small deposits.
Progressive resource rent taxes are an attractive instrument for NODC
host governments desirous of attracting foreign investment to exploit
small, high-cost fields, providing tax rates are set at realistic levels. Such
taxes, however, present governments with a tradeoff: progressive resource
rent taxes are more efficient than other taxes in exploiting small, highcost fields, but the tax structure also shifts a greater portion of risk to
the host government. Depending upon the host country's attitude toward
risk-bearing, the government may be reluctant to assume greater risk.
Moreover, apart from the greater share of economic risk borne by the
host country, resource rent taxes may impose political risks on the government because petroleum tax revenues, which often rouse nationalistic
feelings, will not begin to accrue until a project is well underway and
profitability reaches the predetermined "windfall" level.
Observations
A number of important interrelated effects result from the changes in
NODC contractual and taxation arrangements that have taken place. One
consequence is a blurring of the distinction drawn between the different
types of institutional arrangements which govern the overall structure of
risks and rewards. Rather than a set of discrete arrangements, a continuum
of contract/taxation schemes now provides for different degrees of host
country and foreign investor control over operations, risk assumption,
ownership of crude, and share of profits and rent. For example, concession
arrangements now include some measure of host country participation,
exposure to risk, and discretion over the disposal of crude. At the same
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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time, risk service contracts have become more prevalent than the nonrisk variety, and thus the share of the-risks assumed by the oil companies
has increased.
A corollary to this continuum of oil exploration and development institutional options is that different contractual and taxation schemes can
be designed to achieve a similar configuration of risks and rewards. Thus,
the host government and contractor can face the same set of risks and
rewards through concessions which rely heavily on royalties or through
other contractual arrangements which rely on sharing of output and income or profit taxes. This risk-reward parity can also be achieved by
varying tax rates without altering contractual arrangements. Different
production-sharing splits can yield the same host government/oil company
proportionate share of risks and benefits when combined with varying
income tax rates. This suggests that the wide variation in profit oil splits
noted earlier may have only a nominal rather than a real effect on the
allocation of risks and rewards between the host country and the contractor.
Flexibility also exists in using different combinations of contractual
and taxation arrangements to achieve similar payback rates. Moderately
rapid paybacks can be achieved through a variety of contractual schemes,
including a variable fee per barrel which is analogous to a royalty.52
Finally, increased flexibility and overlapping of contractual and taxation
arrangements are reflected in the structure of contracts which has followed
the changes in tax structure toward allowing the host countries to capture
a progressively higher share of rent. Thus, in some production-sharing
contracts, the host government's share of profit oil increases as production
rises. For example, the production-sharing contracts concluded between
the India Oil and Natural Gas Commission and foreign oil companies
start sharing profit oil at sixty-five percent in favor of the government,
but increase to a government share of eighty percent as production levels
rise.5 3 Bangladesh has a similar system.54
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion suggests that contractual and taxation arrangements may be important determinants of the relatively limited scope
of oil exploration and development investment in non-OPEC developing
countries. Economic theory indicates that investments involving parties
that are risk-averse, perhaps a trait common to both the typical oil com52. Blitzer, Lessard & Paddock, Risk-Bearing and the Choice of ContractFormsfor Oil Exploration and Development, 5 THE ENERGY J. 1-28 (1984).
53. 2 BARRows CoMPANY INC., WORLD PErROLEuM ARRANGEMENTS 99 (1980).
54. Id. at 22.
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pany and NODC government, should be governed by risk-sharing arrangements with the allocation of risk determined by each party's attitude
toward risk-bearing. If, for example, a host government, although willing
to bear some risks, allocates all the risks to the contractor through its
contractual and taxation arrangements, the level of exploration and development investment that takes place in the country may be lower than
it would otherwise be. If this is the case, a reallocation of risk toward
the host government through changes in these institutional arrangements,
for example, replacing traditional concession agreements with servicetype contracts and substituting progressive profit taxes for flat royalties,
will likely increase the level of investment.
There are, however, tradeoffs. First, the general level of taxation in
NODCs may be excessive. High tax rates may fill host government tax
coffers in the short-run, but in the long-run foreign investors will leave
the country or will be deterred from entering the country at all. Tax yields,
moreover, will decline, and oil resources will remain unexplored and
undeveloped. The increase in efficiency brought about by institutional
arrangements better suited to risk-bearing attitudes, exemplified by lower
tax rates, will likely be reflected not only in more investment but also in
a greater shared return to the involved parties. For the host country, greater
government revenues result; for the foreign investor, greater profits. Progressive profit-based taxes create incentives for exploitation of small,
high-cost fields which are characteristic of oil deposits in the NODCs.
Such a tax structure, however,-might burden the host country with a
disproportionate share of the risk relative to the government's willingness
to bear risk.
Finally, risk-bearing attitudes are likely to differ across NODC governments. An institutional arrangement that appropriately governs the
allocation of risks and rewards of exploration and development in one
country may not be appropriate for another country. Two countries which
are equally geologically promising but which have different attitudes
toward risk-bearing, therefore, should offer different contractual and taxation arrangements to attract the same level of investment. Thus, the
substantial degree of uniformity in these institutional arrangements, that
has been characteristic of these countries for the past decade and a half,
may, all other things equal, explain the relatively low level of exploration
investment in some of these areas.

